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Abstract  
 
Language is a powerful tool in the creation of social identities. This work analyses 
the security policy discourses of two major actors in world politics: the European 
Union and the United States. The material is composed of security documents of 
both actors ranging from the time before the 9/11 terrorist attacks to present day. 
Discourse analysis, especially its Foucauldian strand emphasising the structural 
power of language, is used to analyse the material. The work places its main focus 
on the analysis of the term freedom; its occurrence, significance and evolution in 
the security policy discourse. The contemporary security discourse of the U.S. 
emerges from the politico-ideological frames of liberalism and neo-liberalism. In 
the EU, freedom has traditionally been understood as the freedom of movement. 
Since the beginning of the War on Terror in 2001, the EU and the U.S. have used 
an increasingly offensive language in their security rhetoric. The discourses of 
both actors converge over the period of study and rely increasingly on the self / 
other opposition whereby freedom is conceptually opposed to terrorism. 
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1 Introduction 
The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty [...]. We all declare 
for liberty; but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing [...]. 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
1.1 Subject of the Study 
Freedom is a widely used concept in the rhetoric of today’s world politics. It has 
acquired particular significance in the context of the United States’ War on Terror 
that was launched in 2001. President Bush’s administration has adopted a 
proactive conception of freedom that can and should be brought and implemented 
in all parts of the world. Freedom is also a fundamental concept in European 
integration and one of the core values of the European Union. However, its 
political, ideological and strategic understandings differ significantly from those 
adopted in the U.S.  
In my thesis, I intend to analyse and contrast the rhetoric of the European 
Union and the United States in the context of the War on Terror. I am particularly 
interested in the freedom-discourses of these actors. I shall approach the question 
through the framework of discourse analysis. As a part of the social constructivist 
school, discourse analysis is a method that concentrates on the language as a 
social phenomenon. The question of the discursive method will be dealt in more 
detail in the next chapter. In this work, I will use the terms “freedom” and 
“liberty” interchangeably. Other methodological issues will be discussed briefly in 
the next sub-chapter. 
1.2 Methodological Aspects 
I have chosen to compare two significant international political actors, the 
European Union and the United States. For this reason, I shall apply some ideas 
regarding the comparative method that have been described by Arend Lijphart 
(1971). According to Lijphart, the comparative method is a technique for 
discovering empirical relationships among variables. The efficacy of this method 
can be undermined by a setting that presents many variables and a small number 
of cases. One of the solutions to overcome this problem is to focus the 
comparative analysis on “key” variables (Lijphart 1971: 683-690). I agree on this 
interpretation of the problems of the comparative method, but I do think that in 
the particular research setting of my study, the limited number of cases does not 
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pose a serious problem. Moreover, I have selected one key variable – the security 
discourse – as the subject of my study. In this way, I believe to be able to discover 
some comparable features between the two actors, even though they differ on the 
number of other variables. It must be said, though, that Lijphart embraces a 
positivist epistemology according to which science is a generalizing activity with 
an ambition to discover an existing reality. This view does not suit very well the 
social constructivist epistemology adopted in this work (see Chapter 2). 
The question of power is central to any political science study. The question of 
how to analyse it receives multiple answers. According to Nikolas Rose (1999), 
for much of the twentieth century, answers to this question were dominated by the 
massive spectre of the state. The modern state was analysed in terms of apparently 
hegemonic power. Today, the argument by many sociologists and political 
scientists goes in the opposite direction. New ways of analysing political power 
that recognise the complex set of relations between state and non-state authorities, 
the significance of infrastructural powers, networks of power and the like, have 
gained ground. Studies about governance are one image of this tendency. 
Governance “directs attention to the nature, problems, means, actions, manners, 
techniques and objects by which actors place themselves under the control, 
guidance, sway and mastery of others, or seek to place other actors, organizations, 
entities or events under their own sway” (Rose 1999: 16). The argument of my 
work consists to say that discourse is one of these means by which power as a tool 
of governance can be studied. 
In addition to the discursive dimension, I shall employ a historical approach to 
the idea of freedom, in order to determine the evolution of the concept. As will be 
highlighted during the study, taking a historical perspective to the use of the term 
freedom is essential in order to understand its current meanings and implications. 
Political ideologies of classical liberalism and neoliberalism will be explored in 
the work, both in the U.S. and the EU contexts. The present-day uses of the term 
freedom will be constantly contrasted with its previous understandings. 
1.3 Structure  
After the introduction in Chapter 2, I shall define the method of discourse analysis 
and explain its use in the study of international relations. I will emphasise the 
power-related aspect of discourse analysis. I will then move on, in Chapter 3, to 
observe the historical evolution of the meaning of freedom both in the United 
States and in the European Union. In that section, my objective is to present the 
changes in the conception of the term. The emphasis will lie in the current 
understanding of freedom in the neoliberal politico-ideological environment. The 
empirical study of this work will be conducted in Chapter 4, where I shall employ 
the method of discourse analysis in order to study selected foreign policy 
documents of the EU and the USA. The objective of the empirical study is to 
discover the meanings attached to the use of the term freedom in these documents 
and to analyse how they portray and construct the politico-ideological structure of 
the actors in question.  
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Thus, my research question is the following: What use(s) of the term freedom 
do the EU and U.S. security documents apply? It is supplemented by the 
following sub-questions: What is the relation of the contemporary security 
documents to the previous uses of the concept? Do they contribute to the 
securitization of the general discourse and how? 
1.4 Material 
The issues of security and terrorism are situated between domestic and foreign 
policy fields. On the one hand, security measures mainly concentrate on the 
preservation of domestic or “Homeland” security. On the other hand, terrorism as 
a phenomenon has spread worldwide and battles to conquer it are fought outside 
national borders. This is reflected in both U.S. and EU documents. The empirical 
material of my thesis comprises written documents published by the two actors. 
My intention is to study documents of similar political importance in order to 
make them comparable. For this reason, speeches held by both the U.S. President 
George W. Bush and the EU High Representative Javier Solana are not, as such, 
considered in this study. The U.S. documents present, however, introductory 
speeches and fragments of speeches by the President and these texts will be 
analysed.  
In the European Union, the anti-terror measures are mainly dealt with in the 
Justice and Home Affairs Council. They are also closely linked to the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice; a project established in the 1999 Treaty of 
Amsterdam and launched the same year through a work programme adopted in 
the Tampere European Council. One of the European documents, the European 
Security Strategy, is an exception. It was drafted at the request of the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs and under the responsibilities EU High Representative Javier 
Solana (Strömvik 2005: 220-221). It is thus a foreign policy document unlike the 
other EU documents used in this study. In the United States, issues related to 
terrorism belong to the domain of the Department of National Security and the 
President is the head of these policies. 
In order to answer some of the questions above, documents at different periods 
of time have been selected for this study. I have gathered three texts from both 
actors: one before the terrorist attack in 2001, one (relatively) soon after it and one 
in the present situation. For the study of the EU rhetoric, I will use the Presidency 
Conclusions establishing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (1999), the 
European Security Strategy (2003) and the European Union Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy (2005). For the study of the U.S. rhetoric, I will use National Security 
Strategies published in 1998, 2002 and the National Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism of 2006. The documents published by the U.S. Department of National 
Security are more homogeneous than the ones issued by the EU in the sense that 
they follow the same format. The documents will not be studied in their entirety, 
but I will concentrate on the sections concerning the freedom-discourses. 
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2 The Discursive Method in a 
Comparative Security Policy Analysis 
In this work on the security policies of the U.S. and the EU, I have chosen 
discourse analysis as my method. There is no common definition for discourse 
analysis and it has gained ground in the field of International Relations relatively 
recently. It covers a large and heterogeneous field of research topics. Discourse 
analysis is often classified as part of the social constructivist framework of social 
sciences. The social constructivist approaches in general reject the positivist 
conception of observable truth. Social constructivism as such is not a theory but 
rather a philosophical position. Its basic assumption lies in the hypothesis of 
mutually constitutive social action as a significant factor of the construction of 
identity (Christiansen et al. 2001: 8). According to the social constructivist 
ontology, institutions affect social identities and fundamental interests of actors 
(Risse in Wiener and Diez 2004: 160). One of the interest points in the empirical 
study will focus on the question of constructed identities. 
2.1 Definitions of Discourse Analysis 
In general, discourse analysis can be defined as an analytical approach that 
focuses on texts in the broad sense. The different approaches to discourse analysis 
share the object of study, linguistic entities larger than one sentence, and the 
presence of social and historical context in the analysis. Two main points of view 
as to the nature of discourse are, however, under debate. According to the first one: 
 
Discourse is to be seen as text or textuality, i.e. as a manifestation of the constitutive 
principles of the use of language (in speech or writing), or as these principles 
themselves. 
 
The second viewpoint emphasises discourse: 
 
as a social, psychological and cultural practice, covering both linguistic and non-
linguistic elements. (Visgø 1992: 2). 
 
In my study, I will adopt the second viewpoint although I do not have an 
emancipatory agenda, as do some works of critical discourse analysis. I will place 
the current discourses in a broader perspective by presenting their historical 
backgrounds (see Chapter 3). 
Despite its focus on texts, discourse analysis is not solely a linguistic discipline. 
Orla Visgø (1992) argues that discourse analysis has to be seen as an 
interdisciplinary field where the object of study governs the use of methodology 
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and not the other way around. This is exactly the starting point of my analysis. 
The study of discourse of the European and American security documents will be 
guided by the phenomena found in the material, which will subsequently be 
analysed and discussed. I will try to avoid preconceived ideas and assumptions 
about the texts that would stigmatise the analysis before even reaching the 
conclusions.  
2.2 Speech Acts, Enunciation and the Contested 
Concept of Freedom 
Thomas Diez (1999) explains how language is commonly understood as a tool 
that describes or takes note of reality outside language. He also notes that the 
research concerning the EU, Europe and European integration is largely of this 
constative nature. Yet on many occasions, language seems to go beyond its 
constative function. J. L. Austin thus introduced the notion of “performative” 
sentences (Austin in Diez 1999: 600). The notion of performativeness of language 
illustrates the capacity of the language to perform through the act of speaking 
itself. Actions taken through speech do not only translate into the speaker’s 
actions but can also force others to act. These kinds of actions are called speech 
acts.  
In the context of politics, it is probably uncontested that most articulations 
(negotiation statements, laws, treaties etc.) do or at least intend to do something. 
The signing of the treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community founded the 
first European institution. The system of governance established since then can be 
presented as a remarkable collection of speech acts and their effects. The 
evolution of the EU has taken place through declarations, treaties, decisions by the 
European Court of Justice and Community legal acts. Such speech acts have 
important social and political consequences (Diez 1999: 601-602). Moreover, 
according to Kenneth Glarbo, a realist understanding of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy is not entirely satisfactory for the study of foreign policy 
coordination. European political cooperation should thus be viewed as a case of 
social construction (Glarbo in Christiansen et al. 2001: 141). In my work, I will 
take into consideration the nature of the EU and U.S. security documents as 
speech acts. Also, the writers of these documents definitely have the purpose of 
performing several actions e.g. identifying threats, establishing allies and enemies 
and so on. These questions will be analysed more in detail in Chapter 4. 
Michel Foucault took the idea of the performativity of the language one step 
further as he concentrated on the power structures vehiculed and maintained by 
discourse. He centres his attention on the discourse as enunciative construction. 
Enunciation is the act of producing certain discourse in a certain setting. The 
identification of the enunciator implies uncovering the power structures, since the 
actor who is in the position to enunciate also holds power over the subjects of 
enunciation. The position of enunciation presupposes institutions in which 
discourses are produced and propagated. These institutions are broadly taken as 
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structures that set the limits for the enunciation. They pose both the enunciator 
and the addressee and set standards for the possible and acceptable contents of 
what can be said. This strand of discourse analysis tries to find out the conditions 
to be able to enunciate a certain discourse. Power is thus seen as a structural 
phenomenon. (Foucault in Visgø 1992: 6-7). In the context of the European and 
American security strategies, it can be stated that they are an illustration of an 
institution that grants the power of enunciating to the few and leaves the role of 
addressee to the many. The idea of the performativeness of the language is 
similarly addressed by Jennifer Milliken (1999). She explains that beyond giving 
a language for speaking about phenomena, “discourses make intelligible some 
ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing a 
particular ‘regime of truth’ while excluding other possible modes of identity and 
action.” (Milliken 1999: 229). Discourses define subjects that are authorised to 
speak and to act and the relations between the actors. They also define the 
knowledgeable practices performed by these subjects towards the objects which 
the discourse defines. In the process, people may be destroyed as well as 
disciplined, and social space becomes organized and controlled. In other words, 
discourse subjects produce places and groups as their objects. (Milliken 1999:229). 
As discussed above, words and concepts do not portray a neutral reality “out 
there”. If anything, they contribute to the creation of the reality that cannot be 
dissociated from language. In this work, I have chosen to concentrate on the study 
of the concept of freedom in the context of European and American security 
documents. Freedom can be called a “contested concept” that does not have one 
commonly accepted meaning (Diez 1999: 602). The study of the security 
documents will show that freedom represents different things, ideas and values in 
different contexts. What follows from the discussion about enunciation, is that the 
actor who is capable of defining this contested concept also gains power by using 
it. More importantly, he imposes his vision of the contested concept on the 
addressee of the discourse. This power is obviously used to attain political ends. 
This Foucauldian formulation of discourse is more radical than the speech act 
tradition from which it draws upon. It puts more emphasis on the context in its 
relation to the individual actor. Accordingly, discourse has a constitutive role in 
the production of subject identities. (Diez 1999: 603). In order to create a 
comprehensive idea of the term freedom and its use in present-day security policy 
discourse, it is necessary to trace the evolution of the concept and the ideologies 
linked to it. This is the task that I shall deal with in the next chapter. 
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3 The History of Freedom in the 
American and European Politico-
Ideological Constructions 
In this chapter, I shall observe the evolution of the concept of freedom in both 
American and the EU contexts. Even in a democracy, history always involves 
power and exclusion, for any history always portrays the views of someone. 
History and historical evidence are crucial to people's sense of identity and for this 
reason the evidence itself becomes the focus of struggle. (Appleby et al. 1994: 4-
11). The specific feature of this work is that it links historical and discursive 
analysis in the field of security policy. The objective is to unearth the history of 
words and incorporate that research into the analysis of cognitive structures of 
present-day texts. More concretely, my aim is to trace the ideological evolution of 
the contested concept of freedom and reflect on its current meanings in the 
security policy discourses of the actors in question. 
As explained in Chapter 2, the Foucauldian tradition of discourse analysis 
emphasizes the constitutive role of discourse in the production of subject 
identities. The process of producing identities through discourse can be 
conceptualised as a political struggle. Discourse is not only a means of politics –
instead, politics are an essential part of discourse. The struggle to impose a 
meaning on such terms as freedom is not only a struggle between politicians but 
also between the different discourses that enable actors to articulate their positions 
(Diez 1999: 603). This kind of battle over the concepts, and over the dominating 
discourse in general, is constantly ongoing in the field of politics, including 
foreign policy. Actually, the issue of discourse is absolutely essential for foreign 
policy because this policy area consists mainly of discourse and speech acts and 
only to a lesser extent of concrete policy actions. For this reason, it is in my view 
extremely important not to look only at the current stage of a certain debate but to 
trace the evolution of the crucial concepts that are used in the debate. 
Nikolas Rose (1999) argues that the ideas and practices of freedom have a long 
history. It is generally accepted that the liberalist tradition is inherited in the 
Western thought from the philosophy of Enlightenment that promoted an 
egalitarian conception of society. According to this view, there ought to be no 
moral or political hierarchy based on birth or nature. (Saastamoinen 1998: 24). 
Rose explains that freedom became an ideal for all in the course of a profound 
transformation in European and American societies in which modern 
individualism was formed. In part, it is argued, individual freedom arose from the 
particular character of economic relations under capitalism. This economic 
individuation was linked to a more general fragmentation and pluralisation of 
social values and forms of life. Yet, the modes of organising reality in terms of 
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freedom were not an unintended consequence of changes in social and economic 
relations, rather they were invented. (Rose 1999: 66-68). The same argument 
holds true also today. Constitutive discourses continue to play a central role in the 
creation of new social realities. They contribute to the conceptualising of world 
views by labelling acts and actors e.g. through the rhetoric of terror vs. freedom. 
Classical liberalism of the eighteenth century was based on the principle of 
“freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances 
force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life 
according to our own conscience” (Hayek 1944 in Rose 1999: 137). Thus, 
liberalism draws its significance from the fact that it linked systematically, for the 
first time, the art of governing to the practice of freedom. From this point on, 
individuals “must come to recognize and act upon themselves as both free and 
responsible, both beings of liberty and members of society, if liberal government 
is to be possible” (Rose 1999: 68). This kind of liberty, as it is understood under 
the political doctrine of liberalism and which is compatible with liberal arts of rule, 
has a history. It is possible to historicize the ideas that are taken for granted today, 
and in the name of which people are governed today. Historical parallels exist 
between the ethic of freedom and the history of government. Through this type of 
analysis, freedom becomes to be understood not simply as an abstract ideal but as 
material, technical, practical and governmental. (Rose 1999: 63).  
I will now move on to trace the history of the concept and the idea of freedom 
in the American and the European contexts. I shall first explore the American 
meanings of freedom, in sub-chapter 3.1. I will trace the idea of freedom from the 
onset of the United States in the eighteenth century through the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution. I shall then compare those ideas with the 
present vision of freedom in the USA of the twenty-first century. In the sub-
chapter 3.2, I shall study the evolution of the concept at issue in the EU context. I 
shall mainly study the meanings of freedom in the treaty constituting the 
European Economic Community (EEC). I have deliberately chosen to study this 
document as it is a fundamental step on the path of European integration. Tracing 
the evolution of the idea of freedom all the way from the beginning of European 
civilisations would have been a task deserving a study of its own. 
3.1 The Liberalist Tradition in the USA 
In the introduction to the book Freedom in America (1977) Norman A. Graebner 
states that the concept of personal liberty was fundamental to eighteenth century 
American freedom. This implied “freedom from the impediments of class, 
tradition, or governmental favoritism which enforced servility and thereby 
privileged minority” (Graebner 1977: 3). Americans, living in free environment, 
quickly removed all vestiges of the European class system. In an environment free 
from the European guild system and promoting the movement from one 
community to another, mobility early became a central ingredient of the American 
dream. (Graebner 1977:3). This is to be contrasted to the situation in the post-war 
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Europe, in which the lack of labour mobility has been one of the stumbling stones 
on the road of European economic integration. 
For Americans, who lived in a free environment with ample opportunity for 
movement and wealth accumulation, the major restraints lay not in the nature but 
in the government. Political liberty was described a condition where the individual 
enjoyed constitutional safeguards against compulsion or the threat of compulsion. 
Gordon S. Wood (1977) argues that it was not the controversy with Great Britain 
or the Declaration of Independence in 1776 that contributed the most to the 
formulation of the conception of individual liberty. The liberty invoked in the 
struggle for independence did not yet have the precise meaning it had later. In the 
early days of the American democracy, “the people” was seen as a unitary 
homogeneous body having a single interest when set against the power of the king 
or the executive. Consequently, “it was the experience of Americans in the decade 
after the Declaration of Independence, leading up to the formation of the 
Constitution in 1787, that actually made meaningful the Revolutionaries’ concern 
with personal freedom” (Wood in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 44-45). Indeed, the state 
legislatures in the 1780’s enacted laws favouring certain groups over others and 
constantly interfered in the judicial process. The idea that public and private 
liberties do not necessarily coincide emerged only at this stage in the American 
history. The fact that the executive was not the only source of oppression but that 
the legislature could also perform tyranny of the majority was addressed in the 
Constitution and the following Bill of Rights. (Wood in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 44-
49). 
The formation of the Constitution in 1787 laid the basis of the modern 
American conception of personal freedom. It brought out the dual character 
essential to the American constitutional system. Unlike in the British tradition, in 
America a clear distinction was made between legality and constitutionality. This 
implied that all legal acts were not necessarily constitutional. In the eighteenth 
century the abuses by majorities of the interests and rights of minorities were seen 
in a wider context influenced by the philosophy of the Enlightenment. The 
legislative abuses of individual rights were not seen as violations of democracy 
but as products of it. The crucial issue that led to the formation of the federal 
Constitution revolved around the question of how to maintain democracy and at 
the same time avoid its vices. The new federal constitution offered new 
opportunities for diffusing and partitioning power to protect liberty. The division 
of power between different levels of government was the first step of what has 
come to be called the principle of federalism. As a consequence, the ideas of 
personal liberty achieved their first and fullest expression in America. (Wood in 
Graebner (ed.) 1977: 48-53). 
The USA is still today governed by the same document and operates under the 
same system with which it began over two hundred years ago. The right to “Life, 
Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness” (United States Declaration of Independence) 
are still the guiding principles of the American government. The Constitution 
created a complicated political system sustained by a balance of power between 
the majority will and the minority rights. The power is divided between two 
distinct governments (state and federal) and between distinct and separate 
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departments (legislative, executive and judicial). It can be argued that it is 
precisely this balance of forces and separation of functions that has been able to 
adequately preserve freedom and protect the whole scheme from collapsing. 
(Murray in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 103-110). 
In the course of history, the executive became the most effective branch of the 
American system. The presidency has developed as the focal point of this system. 
Since the birth of the state, the power of the president has grown and he has 
carved an increasingly important role for himself. In the words of Robert K. 
Murray: “the president increasingly assumed the responsibility of speaking for all 
the people” (Murray in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 112). The emergence of the United 
States as a world power, the threat of nuclear war, the requirements of national 
security, and the growing complexity of domestic issues have added to 
presidential opportunities as well as responsibilities. In major crisis situations, the 
representatives of the people have consistently granted to the executive all the 
power he has requested. Nevertheless, Murray argues, there are always remedies 
in the constitutional system to rectify the abuses of power of one or the other 
branches of the governing system. (Murray in Graebner (ed.) 1977: 111-113). In 
my view, this point is to be debated in the current context of the war on terror and 
the exceptional rights acquired by President George W. Bush. Since the U.S. 
National Security Strategies are created by the President and his bureau, I shall 
take notice of his role in relation to the question of freedom in the American 
political discourse. 
Before entering the debate concerning the interpretation of freedom in the 
present-day United States’ foreign policy, I shall briefly assess the conventional 
difference between political and economic liberalism. According to Wendy 
Brown: 
 
In economic thought, liberalism contrasts with mercantilism on one side and 
Keynesianism or socialism on the other; its classical version refers to a 
maximization of free trade and competition achieved by minimum interference from 
political institutions. In the history of political thought [...], liberalism signifies an 
order in which the state exists to secure the freedom of individuals on a formally 
egalitarian basis. (Emphasis in original) (Brown 2005: 39). 
 
The present regime in the United States is usually conceived as neoconservative 
and embracing a neoliberal political rationality. As Francis Fukuyama states: 
“Neoconservatism has become now irreversibly identified with the policies of the 
administration of George W. Bush in its first term, and any effort to reclaim the 
label at this point is likely to be futile” (Fukuyama 2006: xi). In order to grasp the 
neoconservative-neoliberal position concerning the contested concept of freedom, 
it is necessary to consider the way in which this rationality emerges as 
governmentality, that is to say, a mode of governance encompassing but not 
limited to the state, and one that produces subjects, forms of citizenship and 
behaviour, and a new organization of the social. (Brown 2005: 37). 
Wendy Brown (2005: 39) argues that neoliberalism refers to liberalism’s 
economic variant. This does not mean that neoliberalism would simply be a set of 
economic policies. Rather, neoliberalism carries a social analysis that reaches 
every domain of the “citizen-subject” from education policy to practices of empire. 
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Neoliberal rationality, grounded in the market, is not only or even primarily 
focused on the economy. It involves extending and disseminating market values to 
all institutions and social action. It contrasts with liberal democracy, which, over 
the past two centuries, provided at least a modest ethical gap between economy 
and polity. Neoliberalism, for its part, extends economic rationality to formerly 
non-economic domains and institutions. This prescribes the action of the citizen-
subject. Individuals are supposed to be rational, calculating creatures whose moral 
autonomy is measured by their capacity to provide for their own needs and service 
their own ambitions. The moral and political judgment of individuals is reduced to 
a cost-benefit calculus. This mode of governmentality convenes a “free” subject 
who rationally deliberates about alternative courses of action, makes choices, and 
bears responsibility for the consequences of these choices. As individual 
“entrepreneurs” in every aspect of life, subjects become wholly responsible for 
their well-being and citizenship is reduced to success in this entrepreneurship. 
(Brown 2005: 40-46).  
Wendy Brown argues that neoliberalism entails the erosion of oppositional 
political, moral or subjective claims located outside capitalist rationality yet inside 
liberal democratic society, that is, the erosion of institutions, venues, and values 
organized by non-market rationalities in democracies. She claims that liberal 
democracy cannot be submitted to neoliberal political governmentality and 
survive. In her view, neoliberal rationality has facilitated the dismantling of 
democracy during the national security crisis caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
“Democratic values and institutions are trumped by a cost-benefit and efficiency 
rationale for practices ranging from government secrecy […] to the curtailment of 
civil liberties” (Brown 2005: 47). Moreover, she argues that neoliberal policies 
and actions disguise under the legitimating cloth of a liberal democratic discourse 
that is increasingly void of substance. (Brown 2005: 46-47). 
The current situation concerning the understanding of freedom in the USA can 
indeed be debated. The terrorist attacks in September 2001 can be viewed for 
several reasons as a turning point in the issue of civil liberties in America. New 
interpretations of freedom seem to emerge, and they are often linked to the 
enforcement of security. I shall not investigate thoroughly the situation of political 
freedom in the USA today. I will, however, as an example, look at a very 
controversial legal act, which has given reason to a lot of debate. The Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of October 2001 known as the USA PATRIOT Act 
dramatically expanded the authority of U.S. law enforcement agencies for the 
stated purpose of fighting terrorism in the United States and abroad. Among its 
many provisions, the act increased the ability of law enforcement agencies to 
search telephone and email communications and medical, financial, and other 
records; eased restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United 
States; expanded the Secretary of the Treasury’s authority to regulate financial 
transactions, particularly those involving foreign individuals and entities; and 
enhanced the discretion of law enforcement and immigration authorities in 
detaining and deporting immigrants suspected of terrorism.  
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The act, and other concurrent reactions to the terrorism, reflect a decision by 
the federal government to view security in terms of “the preservation of the 
security of the homeland.” A more expansive approach to security than the United 
States has previously taken has led to the alteration of many laws and judicial 
traditions, and to a virtual abandonment of the “Cold War era barriers between 
foreign intelligence and domestic law enforcement.” (Relyea 2002 in Jaeger et al. 
2003: 296). Despite the public support (according to ABC- Washington Post poll 
taken 12.9.2001, two out of three Americans were willing to surrender civil 
liberties in order to stop terrorism), concerns have emerged regarding the extent to 
which the new provisions would infringe upon civil liberties. (Rackow 2002: 
1651-1652). Historically, in times of war, patriotism and national security have 
both been used to justify the widespread repression of civil liberties. Paradoxically, 
in the American discourse of the war against terrorism, freedoms are restricted in 
order to protect “freedom”. The PATRIOT Act diminishes the role of judicial 
oversight in criminal investigations as well as citizens’ privacy. While 
individuals’ freedoms are decreasing, agents of repression enjoy increased 
freedom from oversight. (Collins and Glover 2002: 80-82). 
The political implications of the neoliberal rationality for liberal democracy, 
such as those explained in this chapter, are significant. As the example of the USA 
PATRIOT Act has shown, the relation between individual and collective rights 
today is far from being unequivocal. It is thus interesting to investigate the effect 
of these changes on the idea of freedom in the empirical part of my study (Chapter 
4). In the next sub-chapter I shall concentrate on the conception of freedom in the 
context of European integration. 
3.2 Instrumental Vision of Freedom in the European 
Union Treaties 
European integration can be seen as a space for competing ideas, ideologies, 
programmes and discourses. It can thus be understood as a field of competing 
politico-ideological projects. Along the lines adopted by William Walters and 
Jens Henrik Haahr (2005), I shall study the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (1957), in order to determine the meaning of freedom in 
the European integration. The focus shall be on governmentality. The aim is to 
determine to what extent the Treaty proposes a liberal form of rule for Europe, a 
mode that would govern through freedom. This type of rule supposes populations 
that are constructed as free individuals and collectivities. One way to approach the 
conception of freedom in the Treaty is to see in what context it appears. In order 
to asses its meanings, the use of the term freedom should also be contrasted to the 
use of the same concept that has been made in the establishing documents of the 
United States (see sub-chapter 3.1). (Walters and Haahr 2005: 42-44). 
Freedom in the Treaty of Rome is far from the ideas expressed by the founders 
of the United States. The opening sentence of the Declaration of Independence 
proclaims that all men are created equal and endowed with an undeniable right to 
 13 
liberty. Liberty is an individual possession that cannot be surrendered or 
transferred. In contrast, in the EEC Treaty, freedom is not derived from a 
transcendental source and it has lost its relationship with individuality. It appears 
as a certain kind of good that can be provided by a pooling of resources, rather 
than a right held by individuals. Freedom in the EEC Treaty serves an end. It does 
not constitute an end in itself. When the Treaty states in Article 3 that the 
Community shall include the “abolition, as between member states, of obstacles to 
freedom of movement for persons, services and capital” it makes an explicit 
reference to a series of different ends. In this discourse, freedom has become a 
tool, a technology for the achievement of specific governmental objectives, such 
as stability, development and rising standards of living. The status of freedom as a 
tool of government is confirmed throughout the Treaty. It is contextualized and 
tied to various specific activities and practices. Freedom is “freedom of 
movement” for persons, services and capital (Article 3), and for “workers” 
(Articles 48, 135). It is “freedom of establishment for member state nationals” 
(Articles 52, 54) and the freedom to “provide services” (Articles 59, 61, 62, 65). 
(Walters and Haahr 2005: 44-45). 
This type of conceptualization also implies a definition of subject categories 
that are concerned with the EEC type of freedom. The Treaty of Rome does not 
mention the word “citizen”, but there are frequent mentions of other subject 
categories such as producers, farmers, workers, etc. Subjects are thus defined in 
relation to categories of economic and social activity and their rights are 
intimately related to their participation in the economic process. At the same time, 
the freedom of these “citizen-subjects” (to employ the word used by Wendy 
Brown, see Chapter 3.1) is restricted, and subject to regulation. The freedom of 
movement, for instance, is a conditional freedom which allows its subjects to 
move in a purposeful direction only i.e. to seek employment. (Walters and Haahr 
2005: 47). The concept of European citizenship has naturally evolved since the 
establishment of the EEC Treaty. The concept of EU citizen was created in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) and redefined in the Amsterdam Treaty (1998) 
(European Commission web-page). But even with the creation of the citizenship, 
the idea of freedom in the EU stays instrumental and is subordinate to the needs of 
the Common Market. In the empirical part of the study, I shall try to identify the 
type of subjects that the use of the term freedom implies in the European security 
documents. 
Individuals of the Treaty are the object of governmental action and are rarely 
the political authors of such action. They are not defined as the ultimate source of 
legitimacy and authority as in the case of the US Constitution, but are more like 
the possession of states. This type of discourse that promotes a particular reading 
of freedom can be seen as an instance of liberal governmentality. However, 
Walters and Haahr also argue that the promotion of particular kinds of freedom is 
not the sole concern of the Treaty and the Common Market. It is articulated with, 
and in some places confronted by a problematization of security. The question of 
security does not appear as a singular objective in the Treaty but it is 
problematized in multiple ways. (Walters and Haahr 2005: 48-54). 
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The question of security and securitization can be approached through the 
theory of speech acts (see Chapter 2.2). According to Ole Wæver (2000: 251), 
“security is the speech act where a securitizing actor designates a threat to a 
specified referent object and declares an existential threat implying a right to use 
extraordinary means to fence it off.” This means that an issue becomes a security 
issue if the relevant audience accepts the claim made by the discursive actor and 
thus grants the actor the power to modify and possibly even violate rules that 
otherwise would bind. This process of constructing security issues is often termed 
as securitization. Moving an issue to the security realm often carries great political 
implications, which is exactly the reason for doing the security move. In the 
speech act perspective, it is not possible to talk about security that would exist 
independently “out there”. In contrast, this perspective claims that an issue 
becomes a security issue by the securitizing act. (Wæver in Kelstrup and Williams 
2000: 251). The EU and U.S. security documents are illustrations of the current 
security concerns of the actors in question. They are examples of elaborated 
speech acts that construct the threat and security imaginary of the actors. However, 
they should not be misinterpreted as portraying some independent truth about the 
current security situation. 
To return to the analysis of the EEC Treaty, it is possible to read it from the 
perspective of “liberal security”. The Treaty is concerned with securing the proper 
working of the European market economy. In the neoliberal conception of well-
being, security is tied to competitiveness and economic performance. Walters and 
Haahr explain their idea as follows: 
 
The crucial point to note is that market processes are, from the perspective of the 
Treaty, never something which can be taken for granted. [...] Their existence and 
reproduction at a European level is problematic, and cannot be assumed. As such 
they need to be secured. (Emphasis in original) (Walters and Haahr 2005: 55).  
 
At the Treaty level, the securitization of the market economy is addressed through 
the creation of an institutional structure. As has been explained in Chapter 2, in 
the Foucauldian perspective discourse is a productive machinery capable of 
constructing institutional practices. Indeed, it can be said that “structural factors – 
such as institutions, bureaucracies, international regimes, the state of the economy, 
geopolitical emplacement, and so on – are cognitively mediated by the actors in 
question rather than affecting policy actions directly” (emphasis in original) 
(Carlsnaes 1994 in Aggestam and Hyde-Price 2000: 23-24). The security 
discourse that will be analysed in Chapter 4 can thus be understood as more or 
less conscious cognitive mediation produced by discursive actors and creating 
structural factors that we often tend to call “realities”. It will be interesting to 
analyse to what extent the idea of liberal security is portrayed in the EU security 
documents and how they construct new elements of securitising institutions.  
As in the United States, in Europe too, the concept of freedom today receives 
variable interpretation. However, there is a significant difference between the 
understandings of freedom in Europe and in the U.S. due to their different 
approach towards terrorism. Europe has had its share of terrorist attacks (in 2004 
in Madrid and 2005 in London). Nevertheless, no action compared to the USA 
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PATRIOT Act has been taken in the EU or at the member state level. I shall thus 
briefly examine the Berlin Declaration issued in March 2007. This declaration, 
marking the 50th anniversary of European integration, highlights the historic 
achievements of the European Union, the equality of all member states, 
fundamental values upon which the EU is based, and challenges for the future 
(Berlin Declaration 2007). In the declaration, the concepts of peace and freedom 
are associated and freedom is related to the liberation of East-European nations. 
Surprisingly enough, it is not mentioned as one of the core values alongside with 
mutual solidarity, respect for diversity and tolerance. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that freedom is still not a focal point in the EU discourse. Moreover, 
commentators repeatedly underline the economic dimension of the Union (e.g. 
The Times 3.3.2007). The drafting of the declaration has shown that the public 
EU discourse is a forum for tensions over defining the cognitive structures that 
guide the integration. Viewpoints ranging from Europe’s Christian heritage to the 
cherished social protections that, for their part, clash with the pro-market policies 
cause discord on the ground. In the next chapter, I shall observe how the 
competing discourses appear in the security policy context. 
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4 Freedom in the Security Policy 
Discourse 
The authors of the book Collateral Language state, somewhat provocatively, that 
“language is a terrorist organization...” (Collins and Glover 2002: 1). Even if this 
statement is overblown, it catches some crucial aspects of the security discourse. 
The discourses produced by the European Union and the United States are tools of 
creating enemies and identifying threats just as much as consolidating alliances. In 
this chapter, I shall explore the language of six security documents, three by each 
actor (for the description of the material see Chapter 1.4). It will not be possible to 
conduct a thorough discourse analysis on all the documents. For this reason, I 
shall concentrate on some specific aspects that relate, on the one hand, to the 
historical discussion of the previous chapter and, on the other hand, to the 
cognitive construction operated through these discourses. Hence, the main interest 
will be to discover to what extent the idea of liberal security is portrayed in the 
security documents of both actors. Moreover, the construction of the self, the 
other and their relation will be examined. All these issues will be observed 
through the analysis of the conceptual field of freedom. For this purpose, I shall 
concentrate on some, in my view the most interesting parts of the texts. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, language can be a means for creating and 
maintaining structures of power. Political power, for its part, can be used in the 
process of identity formation. A common language, together with common modes 
of thought on which it is based, can provide to the formation of a collective 
identity and to its material existence (Tonra 2003: 743-744). The power of 
representation is embedded in the self / other distinctions that are created by the 
discursive actors. The predominant view in both academic and political discourses 
is that the modern self is western, male and rational. The diversity of the other is 
rarely addressed. On the contrary, the other is often portrayed as an empirical 
object defined only with respect to what it is not rather than with respect to what it 
is. (Murphy and Rojas de Ferro 1995: 64). These tendencies become increasingly 
noticeable in the empirical material when approaching the present moment. The 
terrorist acts in September 2001 and the subsequent declaration of war on terror 
have influenced especially the U.S. discourse to portray terrorism as the essential 
other as opposed to the self. In the EU, these perceptions are more temperate, but 
significant changes can be observed in the recent documents. 
According to George Lakoff, understanding political positions requires 
understanding how they fit in certain moralities. As explained in Chapter 2, the 
use of language is not neutral and employing it in a defined moral or political 
conceptual system uses and reinforces that conceptual system. (Lakoff 1996: 384). 
In a later article Lakoff (2001) argues that the 9/11 terrorist attacks launched a 
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frantic search for metaphors in the U.S. administration. The fact that the 
proclaimed “War on Terror” was anything but a traditional type of war with a 
nationally defined enemy army increased the need for new metaphors. Moreover, 
the war discourse also seems to determine the U.S. domestic policy agenda. As a 
consequence it will allow the neo-conservative leadership to “do whatever they 
want in the name of national security” (Lakoff, 2001). The question of conceptual 
metaphors is of crucial importance for this work. Both the U.S. and the EU 
present a set of underlying morality assumptions that also translate in their 
security discourse. On the other hand, these moralities shift according to the 
political convictions of the actors. In this way, the change in leadership also 
affects the discourses of the actor. I presume that these changes of moral focus are 
more perceivable in the president-led American politics than in the consensus-
driven EU of 27 member states. 
In my analysis, I shall follow the ideas of Jennifer Milliken about the predicate 
analysis as well as the thesis of Norman Fairclough about the practice of discourse 
analysis. Predicate analysis focuses on the language practices of predication – the 
verbs, adverbs and adjectives that attach to nouns. Predications of a noun 
construct the thing that is named as a particular sort of thing, with particular 
features and capacities. (Milliken 1999: 232). I shall apply this approach to the 
noun freedom. 
4.1 Freedom before the War on Terror 
The first two documents that I shall analyse are from the time before 2001. For the 
EU, I shall study the Tampere Presidency Conclusions of 15-16.10.1999 and for 
the U.S., the National Security Strategy for a New Century of October 1998
1
.  
The European Council's Presidency Conclusions start with a general 
introduction that states the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice 
(AFSJ) and the appointment of a new Council Secretary-General who will also 
take the responsibility of the High Representative of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. What is interesting in the introductory part is the use of the 
expression “to be determined” in relation to the creation of the AFSJ. This verb is 
a clear statement of the decisiveness and firmness necessary to confirm the 
actorness of the European Council. The introductory part is followed first by the 
Tampere milestones, and then by subsequent chapters explaining the different 
policy initiatives taken by the European Council.  
The main objects of analysis of the Presidency Conclusions, for this study, are 
the nine Tampere Milestones towards a Union of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
The very name “milestones” is noteworthy since it implies the idea of a road or a 
path that the Union should follow. In the first point of the milestones, a statement 
is made concerning the common values of the European integration. It is said to 
be “[...] firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom [...]” (PC 1999: 2). The 
                                                 
1 In the text I shall refer to the Tampere European Commission Presidency Conclusions as PC 
1999 and to the United States National Security Strategy for a New Century as NSS 1998. 
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evocation of roots in relation to values underlines the perception of common 
history. The expression “shared commitment” strengthens the idea of community 
especially since the subject of this sharing is not explicit. All participants to the 
European integration are supposed to share the commitment to freedom. The 
document intends to speak in one voice on behalf of all Europeans even though 
the EU does not have a political representative comparable to the U.S. president. 
This statement is clearly a constitutive cognitive act that can be interpreted as a 
part of the construction of the European community at the level of ideas and 
perceptions. 
The second point of the milestones presents a totally different image of 
freedom. In this paragraph, freedom is not anymore a vaguely defined core value, 
but a more concrete concept. An environment has to be created where freedom 
“can be enjoyed” (PC 1999: 2), in the same way as other consumer goods. These 
statements can be interpreted as illustrations of the liberal economic ideology 
already established by the EEC Treaty (see Chapter 3.2). The only concrete 
example of freedom given in this part concerns the freedom of movement of the 
EU citizens. Under the third point, freedom continues to be treated as a 
quantifiable good. In this part, it is however presented in negative sentences from 
the viewpoint of those “world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens 
take for granted” (PC 1999: 2). Interestingly enough, the negative sentences are 
used to present a positive outcome. Freedom is “not + exclusive” i.e. it is 
inclusive and it would be “in contradiction with Europe's traditions to deny such 
freedom” (PC 1999: 2) i.e. it is granted. The conclusion of this presentation is that 
the EU needs to develop common asylum and immigration policies. 
In the fifth point, freedom is represented as something that requires securitizing 
measures in order to be enjoyable. It is linked with the creation of the AFSJ and 
especially the area of justice. Freedom thus needs to be promoted through legality 
and law. Criminality is seen as the main opposite to freedom. In the same logic, 
the sixth point emphasises the threat posed to freedom by “serious crime” (PC 
1999: 2). In order to secure freedom, crime and criminal organisations must be 
fought. It is noteworthy that the document does not mention the word “terrorist” 
or “terrorism” at all. Finally, the seventh point underlines that the AFSJ should be 
based “on the principles of transparency and democratic control” (PC 1999: 2). 
This is the classical mantra of the European integration that still has not reached 
the proper level of either transparency or democratic control, at least in the eyes of 
the citizens. All in all, it can be said that the Tampere Presidency Conclusions, 
even though they are concerned with freedom, only present a very instrumental 
view of it. Terrorism is not seen as a valid threat and accordingly, freedom is not 
its counterpart. Even though the term appears relatively often in the milestones 
part of the text, it still seems to be secondary in its importance and subordinate to 
other economic and legal concerns. 
The National Security Strategy for a New Century is a much longer document 
than the European Council Presidency Conclusions. Of its nearly sixty pages, I 
shall mainly concentrate on the preface and the introduction that express the U.S. 
values more in general. The rest of the chapters are devoted to a more detailed 
description of security policies. In the United States, the president is at the centre 
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of the national security policy process. The closed nature of the process, the 
limited number of political actors involved outside of the executive structure, the 
limited knowledge of the general public on such matters, and the tradition of 
deference to the president on national security reinforces the president’s dominant 
role (Sarkesian in Cimbala (ed.) 1984: 318). This also applies to the NSS 1998 
where the text makes direct reference to the enunciator of the strategy, President 
Clinton, e.g. through the use of the personal pronoun “I”: “I have instructed”, “I 
am confident”, etc. This can be contrasted with the situation in the EU, where no 
single political actor is capable or allowed to formulate the security views of the 
Union. 
The preface starts with a high-flown statement that portrays the United States 
as the “world’s most powerful force for peace, prosperity and the universal values 
of democracy and freedom” (NSS 1998: iii). The tone of the text is more informal 
and direct than of the PC 1999, possibly due to the extensive use of personal 
pronouns. The reader is included in the realm of the reality presented by the NSS 
1998 from the very first sentence that uses the first person of plural: “As we 
approach the beginning of 21st century” (emphasis added) (NSS 1998: iii). 
Similarly, the first paragraph also uses the possessive pronoun “our” to refer to the 
American nation and people. This kind of use of pronouns continues throughout 
the document. According to Norman Fairclough (1989: 127), the choice between 
pronouns is tied with relationships of power and solidarity. The actor that uses 
pronouns inclusively (“we” that refers to the reader as well as the writer) makes 
an implicit authority claim that he has the right to speak for others. This kind of 
use serves the type of ideology that stresses the unity of a people at the expense of 
recognition of divisions of interest. (Fairclough 1989: 128). In the case of the NSS 
1998, these types of objectives are most likely. When it comes to the first point, 
the whole document is attributed to President Clinton, who in this way speaks for 
the American people. Secondly, constructing a unity of a nation is essential to 
security discourses. In this sense, the individual liberty cherished in the classical 
liberalist tradition gives way to collective security. This tendency is noticeably 
reinforced in the later U.S. security documents. 
After the introductory paragraphs of the preface, the image of freedom changes. 
The three core American objectives are stated to be: “to enhance our security, to 
bolster America’s economic prosperity, to promote democracy abroad” (NSS 
1998: iii). In relation to these objectives, freedom is subordinate to economic 
prosperity and appears under the concepts of free markets and free trade. The NSS 
1998 proposes to promote free trade through the World Trade Organization and 
free trade areas. It asserts that the forces necessary for a healthy economy also 
deepen democratic liberties. Democracy and free markets are associated on 
several occasions as nominal phrases. This use of language is a perfect example of 
constructing the economic liberalist ideology as it has been described in Chapter 
3.1. In the very last sentence of the preface, the NSS 1998 refers to the historical 
role of the United States and the call for global leadership: “At this moment in 
history, the United States is called upon to lead – to organize the forces of 
freedom and progress [...]” (NSS 1998: iv). This sentence leaves unclear the 
agency of the call. The obfuscation of agency may be ideologically motivated 
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(Fairclough 1989: 124), which I think is the case in the NSS 1998. It is unclear if 
the call for leadership comes from the global community (and who would act as 
its voice?) or from the U.S. national interests. I believe that the vagueness of the 
language concerning the agent is deliberate. 
The introductory chapter that follows the preface starts with a reference to the 
preamble of the U.S. Constitution. In this reference, liberty is once again brought 
up as a core value guiding also the American security principles. Later in the 
chapter, the more vague principle of liberty is concretized as the safeguard of 
political liberties. (NSS 1998: 1). This is the only clear and explicit reference to 
political liberties in the document, although their meaning is not further explained. 
In the fourth paragraph of the introduction, freedom appears once again under the 
label of free market economics. Moreover, in this paragraph it is presented as an 
inherently American value: “Many nations around the world have embraced 
America's core values of representative governance, free market economics and 
respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law [...]” (NSS 1998: 1).  
As a conclusion to the analysis of the U.S. National Security Strategy for a 
New Century, it can be said that it presents a vision of freedom that well 
corresponds to the neoliberalist ideology in its current form. Freedom is mainly an 
economic concern. When reference is made to freedom as a core value, the 
meaning of this is never explained. Even though terrorism is already presented as 
a threat to U.S. security, it is not linked as intensively to the freedom rhetoric as it 
will be in later documents. In my view, the NSS 1998 and the PC 1999 use a very 
similar discourse in relation to freedom and in neither of them promoting freedom 
is a high priority. The PC 1999 presents a subject that is more receded from the 
discourse (no use of personal pronouns) and is in general more technical and less 
appealing to the wider public. The milestones part of the text was, however, 
rhetorically more varied than the technocratic documents in general. The next sub-
chapter will analyse documents that have been written after the terrorist attacks in 
2001. My hypothesis is that the freedom discourse of the more recent documents 
will present noticeable changes in relation to the older ones, especially when it 
comes to the conceptualising of the “free world” against the “un-free / terrorist 
world”. 
4.2 The Security Strategies after 9/11 
The National Security Strategy of the USA of September 2002 and the European 
Security Strategy of December 2003 are probably the most studied documents in 
this field
2
. Because of their relatively uniform format, they present a more fruitful 
topic for comparison than the older documents. The reason for this is quite 
obvious. The ESS 2003 was informed to a certain extent by the existence of the 
American model (Duke 2004: 459). Also, the ESS is partly a response to feelings 
that a common expression of the Union’s ambitions in the field of security and 
                                                 
2 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America will be referred to as NSS 2002 
and the European Security Strategy as ESS 2003. 
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defence policy was needed. Nonetheless, there are significant formal differences 
between both texts in terms of length, depth and language. The NSS 2002 is more 
than twice as long as the ESS 2003, it is more elaborative on key points and 
presented with an air of authority and decisiveness (Berenskoetter 2005: 73). As 
asserted all along this study, policy documents including security documents are 
themselves political tools that carry specific messages for both domestic and 
international audiences. According to Felix Sebastian Berenskoetter:  
 
The NSS shows an assertive US government making a case for its ‘war on terror’, 
with the aim of closing the debate on the purpose and role of the US power in the 
post-Cold War world. In turn, the ESS, part of a long-term process of building up a 
common European Foreign and Security Policy, shows an EU attempting to increase 
its stand as a credible global player and thus open the debate among member-states 
to clarify the EU’s security identity. (Emphasis in original). (Berenskoetter 2005: 
73). 
 
These positions of the two actors are to be kept in mind when analysing the 
freedom discourses in the two security documents. 
The NSS 2002 begins with an introductory letter from President George W. 
Bush. It is the most interesting part of the document for the study of freedom 
discourse. The letter opens with a statement that the twentieth century has 
witnessed great struggles between liberty and totalitarianism that have ended 
“with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom [...]” (NSS 2002
3
). Starting 
from this very first sentence, freedom is constantly represented as a counterforce 
to some kind of negative force. These negative forces incorporate (or can 
incorporate) different concepts that are presented as non-American e.g. 
“totalitarianism”, “the enemies”, “terror”, “war”, “evil design of tyrants”, 
“poverty and disease” and “foes”. 
In the letter, the idea of freedom is defined somewhat more precisely than in 
the NSS 1998. Freedom is characterised as embracing both “political and 
economic freedom” and it includes the right for people: “to be able to speak freely; 
choose who will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children [...]; 
own property; and enjoy benefits of their labor” (NSS 2002). The values of 
freedom are thus defined quite explicitly. The letter also presents the U.S. as an 
actor who promotes freedom in the world. Paradoxically, the text states that the 
U.S. aims at promoting human freedom in the way that all nations and societies 
could choose the political and economic liberty promoted by the U.S.: “We seek 
instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom: conditions in 
which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and 
challenges of political and economic liberty” (NSS 2002). The use of colon that 
links the two parts of the sentence gives the latter part an explicative meaning in 
relation to the first part. What is meant by “human freedom” is thus explained in 
the last part of the sentence, which for its part clarifies what “choosing” means in 
the American security rhetoric. What is paradoxical about this statement is that 
the conduct of freedom, in principle, presupposes the possibility to choose 
between all the available options. In this case, however, the U.S. explicitly 
                                                 
3 The introductory letter does not contain page numbering. 
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restricts the freedom of other nations in the name of freedom. This mindset 
reflects for its part the curious view of the current American leadership, that 
“freedom” can be promoted by restricting freedom (cf. Collins and Glover 2002: 
80-82 in Chapter 3.1). 
Later in the introductory letter, freedom is associated with the cooperation of 
the world’s other great powers. These feature Russia and China, but the EU or 
Europe in general does not explicitly appear as a partner in the group of “freedom-
loving nations” who would share the same values of freedom with the USA. The 
reason for this is probably not in the security values of the EU but rather in its 
relative insignificance for the American security scheme. Besides, the USA 
expresses its willingness to “extend the benefits of freedom across the globe” 
(NSS 2002). What is meant by the “benefits of freedom” in this context is “the 
hope for democracy, development, free markets, and free trade” (NSS 2002). 
Hence, the letter continues the neoliberal political discourse already present in 
NSS 1998 that links democracy and free trade in the same cognitive sphere. 
The primary body of the NSS 2002 is divided in 9 chapters. The first one is 
titled: Overview of America's International Strategy. This first chapter begins with 
a citation from a speech by President Bush. In this fragment of a speech, the 
President proclaims the American nation as the safeguard of “a peace that favors 
liberty” (NSS 2002: 1). In the same logic as in the introductory letter, the positive 
values carried by “our nation” are contrasted directly to threats “from terrorist and 
tyrants”. Moreover, President Bush promises to encourage “free and open 
societies on every continent” in order to “extend the peace” (NSS 2002: 1).  
The text of the strategy then goes on in the same tone as in the introductory 
letter. The United States is presented as a strong nation with a mission (the reader 
is included in the nation by the use of personal pronouns) and which has no equal. 
An interesting statement is made at the end of the first paragraph of the first 
chapter: “The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of 
power that favors freedom”. This sentence presents several keys for interpretation. 
First of all, it clearly illustrates the realist world-view of the writers of the 
document. The situation of “balance of power” is presented as a necessity, and its 
possibility or appropriateness in the present political situation is not impugned. On 
the other hand, the whole concept of balance is destabilised by the assertion that it 
should “favor freedom”. During the Cold War, when the idea of the balance of 
power was the most salient, it literally implied balance between the military and 
political power of the two ideologically opposed camps. In the new American 
security conception, balance can seemingly be extended in the advantage of one 
camp. In my view, this perception ruins the whole idea of balance. Since the U.S. 
does not currently have an equally powerful counterpart in the present world, it is 
anachronistic to speak about a balance of power.  
This overview of the NSS 2002 has shown how the freedom-discourse has 
evolved after the 9/11 terrorist attack. First of all, freedom and terrorism are 
contrasted in a totally new way. However, these new allegations repeatedly 
stumble on paradoxical argumentation that has been explained in the chapter. This 
type of discourse aims at the securitisation of the general vision of freedom. In 
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addition, the liberalist rhetoric that presents freedom as free markets is 
omnipresent in the document.  
The introduction to the European Security Strategy highlights the fact that 
“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free” (ESS 2003: 1). What 
is meant by freedom in this opening statement is left for the reader to interpret. 
The next paragraph explains that the “creation of the European Union has been 
central to this development”. The use of the indefinite pronoun “this” links the 
two statements together. The term freedom does not appear as frequently in the 
ESS 2003 discourse as in the NSS 2002. Still, in the first chapter of the document, 
“the spread of democracy” has allegedly “brought freedom and prosperity to many 
people.” What is noteworthy in this statement is that neither the EU nor Europe 
proclaim themselves as a carriers of these positive values, at least not directly. 
The positive development is, in the ESS 2003 interpretation, the result of the: 
“Flow of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of 
democracy” (ESS 2003: 2). This formulation gives the impression that some 
unidentified market forces, technological advancement and democracy in general 
are the bearers of freedom. The role of human (and European) agency is 
purposefully left unspecified.  
In contrast to the PC 1999, terrorism is now presented as a key threat to Europe. 
Moreover, in relation to the terrorist threats, the European societies are referred to 
by a personal pronoun: “[Terrorism] seeks to undermine the openness and 
tolerance of our societies” (ESS 2003: 3). This example (not unique in the text) 
shows a noticeable change in comparison to the dissociated and technocratic 
jargon of the Presidency Conclusions. Yet, Biscop criticizes the ESS 2003 of 
being overly threat-based. This characteristic is illustrated by the overestimation 
of the terrorism threat and by overemphasizing the need to address it. Such threat-
based approach carries a risk of focusing too much on defence to the detriment of 
prevention (Biscop 2004: 16-17). 
Not surprisingly, given the EU’s evolution, the strategy strongly emphasizes 
multilateral co-operation with and within international organizations. It recognises 
that international cooperation is a necessity. Interestingly, the transatlantic 
relationship is identified as a core element of the international system. As can be 
recalled from the previous overview of the NSS 2002, the U.S. document did not 
even mention the EU as a partner. The rhetoric in relation to the cooperation in the 
ESS 2003 is quite remarkable: “Acting together, the European Union and the 
United States can be a formidable force for good in the world” (ESS 2003: 13). 
This statement is very far from the traditional, neutral EU-language. The issue of 
morality is explicitly brought forward and can be related to the moral discourses 
of the American neo-conservatives (see Lakoff previously in this chapter). 
Andrea Ellner (2005: 228) explains how the ESS conceptualizes future security 
challenges as negative effects of globalization. The strategy is deeply wedded to 
the concepts of “human security” and “global common goods”, which must be 
protected or enhanced through a mix of political, economic and, if necessary, 
military means. The latter are seen as important, but as a last resort rather than a 
primary tool in protecting security now or in future. It is quite clear, that the ESS 
2003 presents a whole new kind of approach to the tackling of security issues in 
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the EU context. It is in the midway between a simple exchange of information and 
a fully operative community of action. At the same time, it is not based on a mere 
“least common denominator” discourse, but aspires for a genuine common 
understanding. The ambition is to include the “peoples of Europe” in the cognitive 
sphere of “our societies”. 
The two strategies share a number of things in common. The main one being 
the belief that security challenges of the future are likely to be varied, often with 
deep social, economic or religious underpinnings (Duke 2004: 463). However, the 
fact that the European Security Strategy does not adopt a far-reaching discourse of 
freedom is in my opinion a clear difference in relation to its American counterpart. 
Moreover, the ESS 2003 does not present freedom as the opposing force against 
terrorism or other threats. Rather, it presents a more classical view of freedom that 
is a central, yet undefined value. It lacks the moral tone of the NSS 2002. 
Freedom in the security context has also moved on from the very instrumental 
view that was made of it in the PC 1999. Freedom no longer appears as the 
freedom of movement nor is it associated as strongly to economic activity as 
previously. This, however, could be explained by the different nature of the PC 
1999 and ESS 2003 documents. While the former was primarily aimed at the 
development of the internal policies of the Union, the latter presents the first 
resumed attempt to formulate a foreign policy strategy. Moreover, the ESS is not 
intended to be subject to frequent change (Duke 2004: 460). I think that this 
aspect of the ESS is crucial, since it defines the future path and depth of 
integration in security matters.  
4.3 The Security Discourses Today 
The last two documents that I shall study are the most recent available security 
documents of the two actors. They are both intimately related to the issue of 
terrorism which is also translated in their discourse. For the EU, I will study the 
European Counter-Terrorism Strategy that was adopted by the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council in December 2005. For the United States, the object of study will 
be the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of September 2006
4
. The 
American version is an update of an earlier counter-terrorism strategy from 2003. 
The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy presents four pillars for “combating 
terrorism”. They are: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. The main text of the 
document is arranged under these headings. The term freedom appears for the first 
time in the first paragraph of the introduction: “[Terrorism] poses a serious threat 
to our security, to the values of our democratic societies and to the rights and 
freedoms of our citizens [...]” (ECTS 2005: 6). For the first time, in the EU 
discourse studied for this work, terrorism is directly presented as the antipode of 
positive values that include freedom. Moreover, the general tone of the 
introduction is more offensive than in the older documents. It is created through 
the vocabulary in general (“combating terrorism”, “international terrorist threat”) 
                                                 
4 Respectively referred to as ECTS 2005 and NSCT 2006. 
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and reinforced by the assertiveness of the discourse that is combined with 
generalising statements: “Terrorism is a threat to all States and to all peoples” 
(ECTS 2005: 6). The use of possessive personal pronouns (“our security”, “our 
democratic societies”, “freedoms of our citizens”) gives the impression that the 
positive concepts somehow belong to “us” and can not be associated with “them”.  
In the second paragraph of the introduction, the term freedom is used to 
characterise the EU: “The European Union is an area of increasing openness, […] 
allowing for free movement of people” (ECTS 2005: 6). This is the more typical 
use of the concept in the EU context and concerns the core principle of the  EU – 
the free movement of people. It has been commented upon in previous sub-
chapters. The general tone of the discourse gets milder and more technical later in 
the text and freedom is no longer mentioned. The four main chapters that are 
organised under the four pillars mainly present practical issues and describe 
different security measures necessary to tackle the issue. The viewpoint is very 
EU centred and does not try to define very precisely the characteristics of the 
“enemy”. The latter part of the text resembles in its discourse more closely the 
traditional EU documents with its elaborated technical descriptions of security 
tools and measures. The American version of the Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism differs significantly from the European one in this respect. 
The first chapter of the NSCT 2006 is titled: Overview of America’s National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism. It opens with a statement declaring that: 
“America is at war with a transnational terrorist movement […]” (NSCT 2006: 1). 
In the next paragraph, freedom is once again presented as the alternative to 
terrorism: “[…] we promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the 
terrorists’ perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule” (NSCT 2006: 1). It 
is interesting to note how the term freedom is flexibly used in different 
conceptualisations. In the same chapter the text then reveals that the U.S. has a 
“freedom agenda” which is conceptually opposed to “al-Qaida’s agenda”. 
Differing from the previous value-laden discourse, this rhetoric resembles more of 
the classical political struggle between parties promoting different agendas.  
The next chapter contains a list of successes and challenges in the present 
situation in the war on terror. They present some very salient cues of analysis. In 
the list of successes the USA PATRIOT Act is praised: “The Administration has 
worked with Congress to adopt, implement, and renew key reforms like the USA 
PATRIOT Act that promote our security while also protecting our fundamental 
liberties” (NSCT 2006: 4). This interpretation gives an overtly positive view of 
the act and seems almost like a direct answer to its critics (see Chapter 3.1). In the 
challenges part, the Iraq war is presented through the discourse of freedom: “The 
ongoing fight for freedom in Iraq has been twisted by terrorist propaganda as a 
rallying cry” (NSCT 2006: 4). It is to be rested that the situation in Iraq is not 
referred to as a war but as a “fight for freedom” which carries more positive 
connotations than “war”. The fact that this concept is used also legitimises the U.S. 
presence in Iraq, since, in the logic of this discourse, freedom is a shared positive 
value and it is legitimate and even justifiable to protect it. At the same time, the 
opposite discourse is discredited and described as “propaganda”. 
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The American strategy focuses much effort on conceptualising the enemy as 
the very image of evil. In the chapter headed “Today’s Terrorist Enemy”, the 
terrorist ideology is described as: “the ideology of oppression, violence and hate” 
(NSCT 2006: 5). The whole chapter concentrates on setting terrorism and 
conceptualising it as far as possible from “us”. Terrorist are the “others” par 
excellence. They are demonized when they are compared to: “a form of 
totalitarianism following the path of fascism and Nazism” (NSCT 2006: 11). The 
historical facts and roots behind these different extremist movements do not seem 
to matter much in the official American counter-terrorism discourse. In contrast, 
the American ideology, incarnated by the inclusive pronouns “we”, “us”, “our”, is 
depicted as a perfect antipode of the villain terrorists. Thus, it can be said, that the 
discourse of this document uses a reflexive construction of identity. Describing 
the enemy with very strong images and linking it intimately to what “we” are not 
is an essential building-block of what “we” are. In this sense, “we” cannot exist 
without “them” – the diametrically opposed image of self. 
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5 Conclusion 
In this work I have studied the freedom discourses of the European Union and the 
United States through a selection of security documents. My ambition has been to 
link the analysis of the current discourses of freedom with the politico-ideological 
background of this term. Hence, the analysis proceeded in a chronological manner 
starting with a historical account of the meanings attached to the term freedom 
both in the U.S. and the EU. In the empirical part I moved on to study the 
contemporary discourses in the security documents of both actors.  
In the United States, the idea of freedom is closely tied to the liberalist tradition 
whereby freedom implies, first and foremost, individual liberty from the 
domination of the state or any kind of authority. The neoliberalist ideology has, 
however, brought new meanings to the term by relating it intimately with market 
rationality. The discourse analysis carried on the U.S. security documents in 
Chapter 4, showed a significant shift from the traditional understanding of 
freedom. In the texts analysed in this work, the term freedom was mainly used to 
construct the image of self against the other – the free Americans against the 
subjugating terrorists. The idea of individual freedom was blurred in the vague 
references of freedom as a common value. The content of this value was not 
explained but the discourse assumed that everyone would subscribe to it. The tone 
of the documents grew more intense when approaching the present moment. The 
juxtaposition of the two world-views was the most accentuated in the latest 
document. It can be said that all the documents intended to construct a certain 
simplified vision of “us” versus the “enemy”, but the discourse reached its most 
Manichean point in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism of 2006. 
In the European Union, the concept of freedom has traditionally been linked to 
the free movement of people. In the 1957 EEC Treaty this was the dominant 
conception of freedom and it did not relate in any way to the individual liberties 
of the citizens. Moreover, at that time, the subjects of the integration were not 
treated as citizens with political and social rights and obligations. They were 
perceived by the Community only in their quality of work-force. Also, alot has 
changed in the EU’s discourse in fifty years. Although the freedom of movement 
and the primacy of the Single Market are still visible in the discourses of the 
Union, new types of ideas are emerging. While the 1999 Tampere Presidency 
Conclusions can be characterised as a quite typical technocratic discourse, the 
European Security Strategy of 2003 marks a notable shift. For the first time, 
terrorism is presented as an explicit threat to the security of the EU. Yet, the ESS 
2003 does not present freedom as the opposing force against terrorism. In contrast, 
freedom is presented as a central but an undefined value. Approaching the present 
moment, the EU discourses also acquire a more offensive tone. In the European 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism 2005, terrorism and freedom-related positive 
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European values are for the first time directly presented as each other’s 
counterpoints. In my view, this evolution is partly an illustration of the American 
influence to the European rhetoric. 
The conclusions of this analysis can be paralleled with those made by Sven 
Biscop in relation to the U.S. and EU Security Strategies (2002-2003). According 
to him, the American strategic thinking has come to be dominated by a security 
rationale. The concepts of national sovereignty, national interest and the balance 
of power have become the cornerstones of the U.S. security policy after 9/11. The 
study of the security documents also showed the tendency of securitising the 
freedom discourses and brought up examples concerning the idea of the balance 
of power. In the EU, the terrorist attacks have also brought about a certain 
renewed emphasis on defence as it is reflected in the formulation of the European 
Security Strategy. Nonetheless, defence issues have not pushed the 
comprehensive approach to security off the agenda. (Biscop 2004: 14).  
This study has clearly justified the significance of a discursive approach to 
International Relations and foreign / security policy studies. This method has 
revealed linguistic practices that could have gone unnoticed if another type of 
method had been applied. Furthermore, discourse analysis does not simply reveal 
these linguistic practices but also makes their interpretation possible. The finding 
that the security discourses increasingly rely on the self / other opposition and 
depict terrorism as the constituent other like never before, is a remarkable fact. 
Moreover, this work has asserted the relevance of discourse analysis for the study 
of power. In the introduction I wrote a hypothesis that discourse is one of the 
means used to control and generate power in governance. Although the empirical 
study was conducted on a limited theme only, it clearly showed that the 
enunciating actor has great powers in constructing the public’s identities. These 
findings also place the work in a larger social constructivist political science 
context where the analysis of identity construction is of focal interest. Future 
research on the U.S. and EU political ideologies should take this dimension into 
consideration. 
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